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 Spinoza and the Science of Hermeneutics
1
 
 
In "Spinoza: Scientist and Theorist of Scientific Method,"
2
 David Savan has raised 
two very important questions: 1) what is the place and importance of Spinoza's work as a 
practising scientist? and 2) what did Spinoza think were the right rules to follow in carrying 
out specific scientific investigations? By connecting these questions, and asking first what 
Spinoza's actual contributions to the sciences were, Professor Savan suggests that in assessing 
Spinoza's epistemology we ought to look not only at his theoretical writings about science, 
nor only at those theoretical writings plus his practise in the Ethics, but also at his practise as a 
scientist in areas which we, who tend to distinguish philosophy from the sciences, would 
count as sciences. If we do this, he contends, we will find Spinoza to be much less the para-
digm of aprioristic rationalism he is generally taken to be, and much more an empiricist. This 
reading of Spinoza's theory of knowledge is one I find highly congenial, since it agrees with 
conclusions I once reached by a different route.
3
 
 
Savan begins with a review of Spinoza's work in physics, chemistry, optics, and ma-
thematics, concluding that 
As far as the natural sciences and mathematics are concerned... although Spinoza was 
thoroughly competent and acquainted with some of the best work of his time, he 
contributed little of importance to research or theory. (p. 97) 
He does not consider whether Spinoza's Hebrew Grammar may have made a significant con-
tribution to the development of Hebrew linguistics, but if he had, I think he would have 
reached a similar assessment: it is a competent work, showing a good knowledge of the best 
available work in the field, but not itself a landmark in the history of the subject.
4
 So far as I 
can see, that is the right judgment to make about Spinoza's work in all those areas, though I 
acknowledge that you need to be (or to be able to rely on) a considerable historian of those 
disciplines to judge the significance of Spinoza's work in them. 
 
Savan, however, is not content to rest with that somewhat discouraging conclusion. He 
goes on to point out one area, at least, in which Spinoza did make a seminal contribution to 
science. In the Theological-Political Treatise (hereafter, TTP) he  
showed that the methods of the natural sciences could be fruitfully extended to the scien-
tific study not only of the Bible, but of historical texts generally. Spinoza is the founder 
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of scientific hermeneutics. (p. 97) 
Savan supports this claim by citing the 20th Century Biblical scholar, R. H. Pfeiffer, as credit-
ing Spinoza and Richard Simon with being "the two founders of modern Biblical criticism." 
Savan points out that Simon, who published his first work in this area eight years after the 
TTP,
5
 acknowledged the priority and importance of Spinoza's work. 
 
After a brief summary of Spinoza's principles of scriptural interpretation, Savan goes on 
to draw a striking conclusion: 
Most of those who have written on Spinoza as a scientist have arrived at an unbalanced 
and even incorrect interpretation because they have tended to focus on his chemical and 
physical experiments. But Spinoza's experimentation in these fields was occasional and 
ad hoc... It was in the extension of the scientific outlook and scientific methods to the 
study of historical texts that Spinoza was innovative and influential. He emphasized the 
importance of the careful collection of empirical data. Variations and changes in the da-
ta must be noted, compared, and cross checked. In several cases Spinoza states that our 
data are quite inadequate and no particular explanation is warranted. In other cases he 
acknowledges that his explanatory hypothesis is tentative and doubtful. In his most suc-
cessful and important scientific work, then, Spinoza is an empiricist. (p. 99) 
In making this suggestion, Savan has opened up what seems to me a very interesting subject for 
investigation. To appreciate the freshness of this you need only compare it with Nancy Maull's 
essay in the same collection, "Spinoza in the Century of Science." 
 
Maull argues that, unlike such contemporaries as Descartes, Boyle, Leibniz and Newton, 
Spinoza made no major contribution to the sciences, and suggests that this was because of the 
inadequacy of his epistemology. She grants that Spinoza performed quite a few experiments, but 
the ones of which we have the most detailed account were undertaken not 
to understand the internal composition of nitre, but in order to confront Boyle with a 
philosophical lesson, namely, that (as we would put it) hypotheses are underdetermined 
by experiment. (p. 5) 
In the end her account of Spinoza's theory of knowledge makes any appeal to experience unne-
cessary. Spinoza is not interested in formulating an understanding of the world which will need 
to be tested against the facts because his primary concern is with constructing a picture of the 
whole of the universe which will lead the individual knower to blessedness. The details of that 
picture are unimportant. 
 
I question whether Maull's account of Spinoza's experimentation in chemistry is accurate. 
If "hypotheses are underdetermined by experiment" means merely that no experimental data, no 
matter how extensive, will ever make a hypothesis metaphysically certain, will ever exclude all 
possibility that an alternative hypothesis is correct, very likely Spinoza would agree.
6
 If, howev-
er, her gloss on the letter to Boyle means something more interesting, say that, for any given set 
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of experimental data, and for any hypothesis which "explains" those data, there is always some 
other hypothesis which will explain them equally well (where simplicity is one of the criteria of a 
good hypothesis, along with experimental fit and consistency), then I'm not so sure. In any case, 
on neither of these interpretations of her gloss does that seem to be the point of the letter of 
Boyle. 
 
Rather what Spinoza says is: a) that if the purpose of Boyle's experiments is to show 
something specific about the constitution of nitre, viz. that it is a heterogeneous substance (i.e., 
composed of particles of two quite different kinds), then they are inadequate for that purpose, 
since the data can be accounted for at least as well by supposing the component particles of 
nitre to be homogeneous, given the right auxiliary hypotheses; to establish the specific conclu-
sion Boyle draws about the constitution of nitre (so far as we can ever establish this kind of 
conclusion) he needs to do more experiments which would disconfirm Spinoza's alternative 
hypothesis (cf. IV/16/10-17/5); and b) that if the purpose of Boyle's experiments is to demon-
strate the falsity of the scholastic theory of substantial forms by showing that the secondary 
qualities of things depend on their primary qualities, then they are unnecessary, since the less 
recondite experiments of Bacon and Descartes have already demonstrated that quite adequate-
ly (IV/25/1-9, cf. IV/64/28-65/2). Neither of these claims involves any depreciation of the im-
portance of consulting experience.
7
 Each, in fact, assumes that the way you learn about the 
world is by experience. 
 
However we ultimately interpret Spinoza's views about chemistry, our concern now is 
with his views about scriptural interpretation. Maull knows that Spinoza wrote a work on the 
interpretation of scripture and that this may have some relevance to what she says, but her only 
reference to the TTP does not show much appreciation of its importance: 
Spinoza suggests that the scientific understanding of nature is by no means an amplia-
tive process, but rather a precarious attempt to apply principles already known by the 
light of reason. In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus he likens the interpretation of na-
ture to the interpretation of scripture, with all the attendant pitfalls. (p. 13) 
That's all in a footnote, and the part I've quoted is all she says about the TTP. I find it a rather 
mysterious footnote. What are the "attendant pitfalls"? And what does Maull think is the point of 
Spinoza's comparison between interpreting nature and interpreting scripture? Those are topics I 
propose to return to later. 
 
David Savan has done us a service in calling our attention to a neglected masterpiece. I 
say this with a particular sense of gratitude, since I am now engaged in a translation of the TTP, 
which has already cost me a lot of time and effort, and will cost a lot more before it's over. I 
would like that translation to have as large a readership as possible. So I, like Savan, am in the 
business of encouraging people to pay more attention to this work. On a less personal note, I 
think the general epistemological moral he draws from his study of the TTP is correct and saluta-
ry. One of the works which helped me to understand the extent of Spinoza's empiricism was the 
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TTP. 
 
But I have reservations about some of the things Savan says about this work, and ques-
tions about the TTP which his article raises, but does not answer: 1) is Spinoza really "the found-
er of scientific hermeneutics"? did he really, as that phrase might imply, have no predecessors 
who made any significant or comparable contribution to the development of the discipline? 2) if 
(as I'm inclined to think) the answer to the first question is"no," then we face a battery of further, 
related questions: what exactly is his relationship to other people in that discipline? to what ex-
tent did his predecessors anticipate his conclusions? what was there about his work which led his 
successors to look upon it as a landmark in the field? and finally, 3) is there such a thing as 
scientific hermeneutics anyway? what is the status of this discipline which Spinoza (either) 
founded (or contributed to in a significant way)? 
 
These are complex and difficult questions, which I can hardly hope to answer definitively 
here. But they are questions of the first importance for our understanding of Spinoza, not only for 
their own sakes, but also because answering them will require us to address the ever-entrancing 
question: how did Spinoza come to be Spinoza? i.e., how did this young man, raised in the Por-
tuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam, come to rebel against the religious tradition in which 
he was raised, and become a symbol in Western thought of the rational reconstruction of reli-
gion? 
 
-1- 
 
About the first question I shall be brief and dogmatic. A priori it seems highly unlikely that any-
one, no matter how brilliant, would deserve the title "the founder of discipline X," for any X, if 
that implies that the person in question created the discipline essentially ex nihilo, as if no prede-
cessor had made any significant contribution. Neither philosophy nor science seems to work that 
way. The idea that any one person can properly be described as the founder of any intellectual 
discipline is a form of the myth of the hero which we should treat with great skepticism. Scien-
tists or philosophers who make seminal contributions to their disciplines typically build on the 
work of predecessors, who struggled to formulate its central questions and propose plausible an-
swers to them. When they are candid, the great figures acknowledge this, as Newton did when he 
observed (with no great originality) that if he saw further than others, it was because he stood on 
the shoulders of giants.
8
 To show that there were in fact giants on whose shoulders Spinoza stood 
will be the task of our second section. 
 
Meanwhile, we should note that Savan really doesn't need to insist that Spinoza was 
without significant precursors in his work on the interpretation of scripture. Surely it will be 
enough for his purposes if Spinoza's work was extremely important in the development of the 
subject. Surely it's sufficient to show some appreciation of scientific methodology if you make 
important, permanent contributions to knowledge in some one of the sciences. You needn't also 
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be the founder of the discipline. Indeed, we might question whether it is necessary for a good 
theorist of knowledge or a philosopher of science to even be an important contributor to 
science. Why isn't it enough just to be competent in the science of your day? Maull's view 
seems to be that if a thinker of Spinoza's calibre was not an important contributor to science, we 
would need to explain why not by pointing to defects in his epistemology. Spinoza must not 
have been an empiricist, look how little he accomplished in science. This seems an odd view. 
Certainly we owe great respect to the views of important contributors to science about their 
own methodologies. But most working philosophers of science are not also significant contri-
butors to science. It seems too much to expect that they should be. Why is it not enough just to 
be competent in contemporary science? 
 
Savan's view, I think, is not that you must be an important contributor to science to be a 
sound theorist of science, but rather that if you are an important contributor to science, then you 
cannot be entirely unsound in your theory of science. That seems right. If we then agree that 
Spinoza did make important contributions to one of the emerging sciences of his day, we 
should want to take another look at his theory of science and ask whether it is really as aprioris-
tic as is usually assumed. So it's a fruitful question just what Spinoza's position is in the history 
of this discipline. 
 
-2a- 
 
Our first question has led quickly to a battery of further questions: What are some of the conclu-
sions of the TTP which have given it its reputation as a landmark work in the history of scientif-
ic hermeneutics? Who were Spinoza's predecessors in this area? To what extent did they 
anticipate Spinoza's views? Who were the giants on whose shoulders Spinoza stood? 
 
One of Spinoza's most famous conclusions was that Moses did not write the Penta-
teuch, i.e., the first five books of the Bible. In his day, Spinoza tells us, "nearly everyone" be-
lieved Moses had written all five books. (TTP viii, 4, III/118/18-20) Spinoza's conclusion, of 
course, is much broader than the mere denial of Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. He also 
thinks Joshua did not write the book of Joshua, the judges did not write the book of Judges, 
and so on. But the denial of Moses' authorship of the Pentateuch seems to have captured 
people's imaginations in a way the other denials didn't, partly because those first five books of 
the Bible are so important to the Judaeo-Christian story of man's relationship to God, partly 
because denying that Moses was the author of these books is denying that they were written by 
the prophet to whom, according to the Bible itself, God revealed himself more clearly than to 
any other prophet, "not in dark speech," but "mouth to mouth," or "face to face" (Deuteronomy 
34:10, Numbers 12:6-8). By comparison, denying that Samuel wrote the books of Samuel is a 
small matter.
9
 
 
Not only does Spinoza deny that many of the books of the Bible were written by the 
people his contemporaries usually ascribed them to, he also argues affirmatively that the cen-
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tral historical books of the Old Testament, in the form in which we have them, are essentially 
the work of one man, Ezra, working long after the events these books describe, in the postexil-
ic period. What Ezra did, according to Spinoza, was to organize and edit materials which had 
been handed down to him from a variety of sources. Ezra wrote for a definite political purpose: 
to show that the tragedy which had befallen the Hebrew people had occurred because they 
neglected to follow the law of Moses (viii, 42-58, III/125/25-128/31). Ezra's Bible is an exer-
cise in theodicy, designed to explain how such a thing could have happened to God's chosen 
people. Although he intended to do so, Ezra did not, according to Spinoza, succeed in making 
a very smooth and coherent narrative out of his history of the Hebrew people. Often he merely 
copied from his sources alternative and inconsistent versions of the same events. Spinoza spe-
culates that perhaps an untimely death prevented Ezra from fully realizing his plan (ix, 2-3, 
III/129/11-21). 
 
Now much of the analysis I've summed up in the last two paragraphs would be ac-
cepted today by all but the most orthodox Jews and the most fundamentalist Christians. Some 
scholars even follow Spinoza in identifying Ezra as the redactor who gave the Biblical narra-
tives the essential form they have today.
10
  But nearly everything I ascribed to Spinoza in those 
two paragraphs you can also find in Hobbes' Leviathan. Certainly Hobbes not only denies the 
Mosaic authorship, but also argues that most of the books of the Bible were written not by the 
people whose names they bear and whose deeds they describe, but by someone else living long 
after the event. Hobbes even anticipates Spinoza in identifying Ezra as the person who proba-
bly put the central historical books of the Bible into the form in which we have received 
them.
11
 Where he differs from the picture sketched here is in not criticizing Ezra for his ina-
bility to make a coherent narrative of the whole. So naturally people have often described Spi-
noza as following Hobbes. This has happened as recently as Harold Bloom's The Book of J,
12
 
and as long ago as Leibniz's first letters regarding the TTP, where he contended that Hobbes 
had "sown the seeds of that very smart critique which this bold man carries out against sacred 
scripture." 
 
Leibniz was most upset by Spinoza's critique, which he saw as undermining the authority 
of scripture.
13
 He does not present Spinoza as merely rehashing material already found in 
Hobbes. His metaphor of seed-sowing implies, what any fair comparison of Leviathan with the 
TTP will confirm, that Spinoza's case for his conclusions is much more thorough and scholarly 
than Hobbes' case.
14
 
 
For example, whereas Hobbes cites only three texts as counting against the 
Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, Spinoza calls attention to nearly two dozen problematic 
passages. The numbers matter in a case like this, since the more passages there are, the more dif-
ficult it is to devise a hypothesis to explain them. The fact that the last chapter of the Pentateuch 
describes the death of Moses is pretty obviously a problem for the theory that Moses was the au-
thor of the whole work. Jewish scholars had acknowledged this problem as early as the Talmud 
and had dealt with it by ascribing the last eight verses of Deuteronomy to Joshua.
15
 In the Re-
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ronomy to either Joshua or Eleazar.
16
  But if there are many prima facie later passages scattered 
throughout the Pentateuch, such simple solutions will not work. 
 
Another difference between Hobbes and Spinoza is that Hobbes makes no pretensions 
to Hebrew scholarship,
17
 whereas Spinoza's case often depends on a knowledge of the Hebrew 
text of the Old Testament and of the Hebrew language.
18
 
 
Leibniz certainly thought Spinoza's 
scholarship made him a formidable opponent: 
I grieve that a man of his evident learning should have fallen so far into error... these 
things tend to overturn the Christian Religion... if only someone could be stirred to ac-
tivity who was equal to Spinoza in erudition, but dedicated to the Christian cause, who 
might refute his frequent paralogisms and abuse of oriental letters. (Akademie ed., I, i, 
148) 
But though Leibniz recognizes Spinoza's superiority to Hobbes as a biblical scholar, the sug-
gestion is still strong, if you look at the totality of Leibniz's correspondence about the TTP, 
that Hobbes had a decisive influence on Spinoza. 
 
Hobbes is certainly an important figure in the history of this subject, and clearly an im-
portant influence on Spinoza in political philosophy; but I doubt that he had any significant in-
fluence on Spinoza's Biblical criticism. The catalogue of Spinoza's library mentions a copy of De 
cive, and he could have been reading that work early in the 1650s, since he had the linguistic 
equipment to do so. Probably he was.
19
 The catalogue does not mention Leviathan, the work to 
which we have to go for Hobbes' biblical criticism, and Wernham cannot find any internal evi-
dence in the TTP suggesting a reading of Hobbes' most mature statement of his theory.
20
 Though 
Hobbes published Leviathan in 1651, for 16 years it was available only in English, a language 
Spinoza could not read. I think that makes it very unlikely that Hobbes' critique of scripture in-
fluenced Spinoza at the time he was excommunicated from the synagogue in 1656. By the time 
Spinoza wrote the TTP he could have read Leviathan either in a Dutch translation (1667) or in a 
Latin one (1668). I'm inclined to think he did.
21
 But he had embarked on writing out his "opinion 
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fense is now lost, but according to Bayle much of what Spinoza later said in the TTP was in this 
early work.  
 
So it seems that the main outlines of Spinoza's position on scripture were fixed well be-
fore he read Leviathan, if, indeed, he ever did read it. We cannot exclude the possibility that Spi-
noza knew Hobbes' De cive in the early 1650s, had his curiosity roused, and took the trouble to 
find out about the later work, say from a friend who could read English, during the critical period 
when he was forming his own theories. But I think there is a better explanation available to us. 
 
In doubting the influence of Hobbes on Spinoza's biblical criticism, I agree with Richard 
Popkin,
23
 though my reasons are not his reasons. He tends to depreciate the work of Hobbes, 
representing him as holding a very cautious view, which only revised traditional theories of bib-
lical authorship moderately, quoting the passage in which Hobbes says 
though Moses did not compile those books entirely, and in the form we have them, yet 
he wrote all that which he is there said to have written. (L xxxiii, 5, p. 418, cited in 
Popkin 1979, p. 217, and 1987a, p. 72) 
Since writers as scripturally conservative as Luther were prepared to acknowledge that some 
parts of the Pentateuch, such as the description of Moses' death, were probably by a hand other 
than that of Moses, Hobbes does not appear very radical in Popkin's account. But whereas Luther 
thought the rest of the Pentateuch up to that last chapter was by Moses, the only part of the Pen-
tateuch Hobbes explicitly ascribes to Moses is Deuteronomy 11-27, rather a small part of the 
whole. Hobbes seems to be aware that there are many other problems with the ascription of Mo-
saic authorship besides the obvious one. And his claim that, not just the Pentateuch, but all the 
central historical books only received their final form centuries after the events they described is 
quite radical compared to Luther.
24
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 Popkin depreciates the work of Hobbes, not to make the work of Spinoza seem more 
important, but to buttress his case that the real founder of modern critical Bible scholarship 
was Isaac La Peyrère, a French Millenarian who published a work denying the Mosaic author-
ship of the Bible in Amsterdam in 1655,
25
 just in time to turn Spinoza from the straight path 
of traditional Judaism before he was excommunicated. Indeed, Popkin sometimes attributes 
such importance to La Peyrère that the reader may wonder whether Spinoza showed any ori-
ginality at all in his critique of Scripture.
26
 La Peyrere is the giant on whose shoulders Spinoza 
stood, sometimes seeming a lilliputian figure by comparison. 
 
Others may believe this.
27
 I can't. Of course Spinoza must have read La Peyrère's work 
at some time. We know he owned a copy of it. He was not so wealthy that he could afford to 
buy books and not read them. La Peyrère's work caused a sensation when it was published 
and Spinoza's earliest critics saw an affinity between the two authors, if not an influence.
28
 
Modern scholars before Popkin have also seen La Peyrère as an important precursor of Spino-
za, even if they haven't presented Spinoza as his disciple.
29
 
 
Nevertheless, Spinoza never cites La Peyrère, though he frequently cites other Biblical 
commentators. The commentator he cites most frequently (more often even than Maimonides) 
is Ibn Ezra, a 12th Century Jewish commentator, for whom he clearly has great respect, as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Esdras," (i.e. Ezra). This is only conditional, of course, but I've argued in "`I Durst Not Write So Boldly’…” that 
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appears from the passage in which Spinoza first raises the issue of the Mosaic authorship: 
Almost everyone has believed [the writer of the Pentateuch] to be Moses. Indeed, the 
Pharisees maintained this so stubbornly that they considered anyone who seemed to 
think otherwise a heretic. That is why Ibn Ezra, a man who possessed an independent 
mind and no slight learning, and who was the first of all those whom I have read to 
take note of this prejudice, did not dare to explain his thought openly, but dared only 
to indicate the problem in rather obscure terms. (viii, 4, III/118) 
Not everyone, of course, reads Ibn Ezra as Spinoza did. Formally, Ibn Ezra affirms the Mo-
saic authorship, censuring an opponent for suggesting that Genesis 36:31 was probably writ-
ten in the time of Jehoshaphat.
30
 Some take Ibn Ezra at his word, others don't.
31
 What counts 
is how Spinoza read him. He builds his case largely on hints he finds in Ibn Ezra. 
 
Perhaps the reason Spinoza does not cite La Peyrère is that he does not take him seriously 
as a Biblical scholar. Certainly he considers it extremely important for the interpreter of the He-
brew Bible to be able to read it in the language in which it was written. His first requirement for 
the history of scripture which is a necessary prelude to our interpretation of scripture is that it 
should give an account of the nature and properties of the language of the text (vii, 15). La 
Peyrère gives no evidence of knowing Hebrew; Popkin grants that he did not, and that this was 
one reason Richard Simon had no great respect for La Peyrère as a scholar (Popkin 1987a, p. 87). 
Does it not seem likely that Spinoza would have shared his view, particularly since La Peyrère 
shows various evidences of having an uncritical mind? 
 
One of La Peyrère's central arguments for his hypothesis that there must have been men 
in existence before Adam (apart from the familiar query about where Cain's wife came from) 
was that other civilizations claim to have much older histories than is implied in the Biblical 
account of creation.
32
 This is an old argument which (as Popkin acknowledges)
33
 Jewish think-
ers had had to deal with since their first contact with the Greek world. Spinoza needn't have 
learned it from La Peyrère. But I think it will be instructive to see how the argument went in 
these earlier thinkers. We may then be in a better position to appreciate Spinoza's contribution. 
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Arthur M. Silver, Menorah Pub. Co., New York, 1988, p. 341. 
31
E.g., Popkin says that Ibn Ezra did not intend to raise doubts about the Mosaic authorship, but "to find reas-
surance." (Popkin 1987a, p. 50) Similarly Edward Gray, Old Testament Criticism, Its Rise and Progress from the 
Second Century to the End of the Eighteenth, Harper, 1923, ch. 8. 
On the other hand, Tovia Preschel writes: "Very characteristic of Ibn Ezra's thought are his mostly veiled sug-
gestions which tend to cast doubt on the belief that the Pentateuch as we have it was written by Moses and which 
have given him the title of the father of modern biblical criticism." (Encyclopedia Judaica, article on Ibn Ezra) Pres-
chel also points out that Ibn Ezra's commentaries on the Bible "enjoyed great popularity and, next to Rashi's, were 
the most widely studied." 
Many philosophers hold that only as a last resort should we interpret an author as having an esoteric doctrine. 
Cf. Alan Donagan, Spinoza, Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1988, ch. 2. But Maimonides plainly invites such a reading of 
his Guide of the Perplexed when he writes at the end of the introduction to Part I about the causes of contradictory 
passages in books, identifies the need to conceal certain doctrines as one of the causes, and acknowledges that this is 
one of the causes of inconsistencies in his own work. In the Pines edition (U Chicago P, 1964) see pp. 18 and 20. 
32
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 Cf. Popkin 1987a, ch. 3. 
 In The City of God
34
 Augustine, in the course of arguing against those pagans who be-
lieve in the eternity of the world and of the human race, undertakes to refute their argument 
based on the antiquity the Egyptians claimed for their civilization (more than 100,000 years, ac-
cording to Augustine, CD XVIII, xl, p. 648). Augustine points out that the pagan historians do 
not agree among themselves about the antiquity of the human race, that the Greeks do not assign 
a greater age to the race than the Bible does (slightly less than 6000 years in Augustine's day), 
and he contends that we ought to give more credence to the Greek histories than to those of the 
Egyptians "because they do not exceed the true account of the duration [of the human race] as it 
is given by our documents, which are truly sacred." 
 
Now to the extent that this argument depends on the sacred character of the Jewish and 
Christian scriptures, we might well regard it as question-begging. We might think we should first 
determine the truth of what these works say before we decided that they were sacred texts.
35
 But 
Augustine does have two other arguments: first, that a text filled with accurate predictions of the 
future is more credible than one filled with "fabulous antiquities," and second, that the pagan his-
torians are less credible than the sacred scriptures because they cannot agree among themselves 
(see particularly CD XVIII, xl, p. 648). 
 
How much weight we attach to the matter of prophecy will clearly depend a good deal on 
when we think the books were actually written. If we think that in their present form they were 
composed many centuries after they events they describe, and hence, after the events they "pre-
dicted," we may not attach much weight to the predictions.
36
 That is one reason why it matters 
not only who wrote them, but when they were written. But what interests me most at the moment 
is the second argument, appealing to the inconsistencies among the pagan historians.  
 
Clearly this consideration will have force only to the extent that the scriptural narratives 
themselves are internally consistent; some versions of the argument make this point explicitly. 
For example, in Judah Halevi's The Kuzari, a medieval dialogue in which a Rabbi defends Ju-
daism to the King of the Khazars, the King says to the Rabbi: 
It is strange that you should possess an authentic chronology of the creation of the 
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 Bk. XII, ch. x, in the enumeration of chapters given in Migne, and followed in the translation by Marcus 
Dods (Modem Library, pp. 390-391). Other editions (e.g., in that of the Bibliotheque augustinienne, tr. by G. 
Combes, Desclee de Brouwer, 1959) count the second paragraph of Migne's ch. x as ch. xi. Subsequent references to 
The City of God (abbr. CD) will be to book and chapter number, followed by the page number in the Modern 
Library edition. But I will sometimes modify the Dods translation. 
35
 Cf. Spinoza, TTP Pref, sec. 19: "Most of [the ministers of the Church] suppose, as a foundation for 
understanding Scripture and unearthing its true meaning that it is, in every passage, true and divine. So what one 
ought to establish by understanding Scripture, and subjecting it to a strict examination, and what we would be far 
better taught by Scripture itself... they maintain at the outset as a rule for the interpretation of Scripture." 
36
 According to Gray, op. cit., ch. 2, Porphyry wrote fifteen books against the Christians and their doctrines, 
drawing extensive replies from Eusebius, Apollinarius and Methodius. All of this is now lost, but Jerome's pre-
face to his commentary on Daniel gives us an idea of the general character of the attack. Porphyry argued that the 
book of Daniel was composed in the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes, about 400 years after Daniel's time, apparent-
ly on the ground that its history (presented as predictions) is accurate up to that time and inaccurate afterward. 
This dating seems now to be generally accepted. See The Interpreter's Bible, Nashville: Abingdon, 1956, vol. VI, 
pp. 349-50. 
 
world.  
To which the Rabbi replies: 
Surely we reckon according to it, and there is no difference between the Jews of Khazar 
and Ethiopia in this respect... 
Later the King objects: 
Does it not weaken thy belief if thou art told that the Indians have antiquities and build-
ings which they consider to be millions of years old?  
To which the Rabbi replies: 
It would, indeed, weaken my belief had they a fixed form of religion, or a book con-
cerning which a multitude of people held the same opinion, and in which no historical 
discrepancy could be found. Such a book, however, does not exist [sc. among the Gen-
tiles].
37
 
Clearly if defenders of Judaism and Christianity are going to claim greater credibility for their 
sacred texts on the ground of their greater internal consistency, it becomes very important to 
know whether or not those texts actually are internally consistent.  
 
And that, of course, is precisely what Spinoza denies, most notably in TTP ix, 16-26, 
where he takes up the claim in 1 Kings 6:1 that 480 years passed between the exodus and Solo-
mon's building the temple. He argues in considerable detail that this total cannot be reconciled 
with other texts giving the length of time various rulers ruled, or periods during which the people 
of Israel were under foreign domination: 
... we cannot establish a correct calculation of the years [between the exodus and the 
building of the temple] from the accounts themselves, which do not agree in one and the 
same calculation, but presuppose quite different ones. So we must confess that these ac-
counts were gathered from different writers... (TTP ix, 26) 
This is not the only chronological inconsistency Spinoza is concerned about, but it is the one he 
devotes the most attention to, and it is interesting for a variety of reasons. 
 
First, there is no analogous argument in La Peyrère. When he raises the chronological 
issue, he does not go beyond what the King of the Khazars objected to the Rabbi, pointing out 
that other civilizations claim longer histories. Spinoza, on the other hand, has a reply to the 
Rabbi's reply. Moreover, La Peyrère doesn't claim any great originality here, acknowledging 
his dependence on the work of Joseph Scaliger at the end of the 16th Century.
38
 It's hard to 
believe that Spinoza was not aware of Scaliger's work on chronology independently of La 
Peyrère, since he seems to have been much concerned about the problem of chronology.
39
  
 
Second, there are indications that Spinoza was worried about these chronological issues 
long before he ever encountered La Peyrère. In TTP ix, 30-31, Spinoza writes: 
If anyone should think that I am speaking too generally here, and without adequate foun-
dation, I ask him to show us some definite order in these historical narratives, which his-
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 Cf. the Metaphysical Thoughts, II, x, I/272/30ff. 
torians could imitate without fault in their chronologies; and while he is interpreting these 
accounts and striving to reconcile them, let him respect the expressions and ways of 
speaking, and of organizing and connecting statements so strictly... that we too could im-
itate them in our writing. If he supplies this, I shall immediately surrender to him, and he 
will be a great oracle for me. For I confess that although I have long sought such an ex-
planation, I have still never been able to find anything like it. I add, indeed, that I write 
nothing here which I have not thought about intensely for a very long time. Although 
from childhood I have been instructed in the common opinions about Scripture, neverthe-
less, in the end I could not but admit these things... (III/135/1-13, my emphasis) 
In context it seems most natural to take "these things" to refer to the claim that there is no 
plausible way of reconciling the chronological inconsistencies he has been discussing.
40
  
 
Third, we can identify sources other than La Peyrère from whom Spinoza is likely to 
have learned about these chronological problems, sources native to the Jewish tradition in which 
Spinoza was brought up. For one thing, the problem about reconciling I Kings 6:1 with other 
passages in scripture was recognized as early as Josephus' Antiquities (VIII, iii, 1). Josephus 
is an author whom Spinoza frequently cites (eight times in the TTP, by my count). And he is an 
author whom Spinoza's teacher, Menasseh ben Israel, thought it worth the trouble to translate 
into Hebrew.
41
 The work in question, Against Apion, is also concerned with a chronological is-
sue: why is it that the Greek historians make no mention of the Hebrew people if the Hebrews 
have a history as old as their Bible implies?
42
 
 
Probably more important, however, is the work of Menasseh ben Israel himself, particu-
larly his Conciliator, first published in Spanish in 1632, then translated into Latin. This work 
seems to have had a considerable reputation in the 17th Century, not only among Jews, but also 
among Christians.
43
 It is a systematic attempt to identify and reconcile all prima facie contradic-
tions in Scripture, motivated by the belief that because the Bible is "in the highest degree true, it 
cannot contain any text really contradictory of the other." (Preface, p. ix) Many of the difficulties 
in scripture which Spinoza raises Menasseh had already discussed at length in this work, among 
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them the problem of the length of time between the exodus and the building of the temple. Con-
siderations of space forbid my analyzing Menasseh's treatment in detail, but I do need to convey 
some idea of his methodology. 
 
Menasseh begins, as he typically does, by laying out very clearly the reasons why there is 
a problem, taking as his starting point a verse in Judges 11:26, "While Israel dwelt in Heshbon... 
300 years." (Lindo, 1, 29) He then explains carefully why it does not seem that that account 
could be correct, giving an analysis of Biblical chronology closely parallel to that in the TTP (ix, 
17). Commenting that "authors have been very solicitous to conciliate these texts and solve the 
doubt," he then explains the theories advanced by various predecessors - J. R. Jose ben Chelphe-
ta, R. Abraham a Levi, R. Levi ben Gershon, and Don Isaac Abarbanel - and the reasons why 
Don Isaac rejected previous hypotheses, particularly that of R. Levi ben Gershon. Finally he 
gives his own reasons for preferring Gershon's theory, rebutting the criticisms of Abarbanel. 
 
The Conciliator is a compendium of Jewish Biblical scholarship and it contains dozens 
upon dozens of examples of the kind of dialectic just described. It seems reasonable to suppose 
that Menasseh's work is representative of the teaching Spinoza was exposed to as he was grow-
ing up in Amsterdam. Even if he did not complete the course in the synagogue school,
44
 we can-
not suppose that he was ignorant of one of the most important works of one of his most eminent 
teachers. To account for the learning he displayed in the TTP, we must assume that he pursued 
his studies of the Jewish tradition as an independent scholar, if not in formal classes. The editor 
of Spinoza's Opera posthuma reports that 
from his childhood on the author was trained in letters, and in his youth for many years 
he was occupied principally with theology; but when he reached the age at which the in-
tellect is mature and capable of investigating the nature of things, he gave himself up en-
tirely to philosophy. He was driven by a burning desire for knowledge; but because he 
did not get full satisfaction either from his teachers or from those writing about these 
sciences, he decided to see what he himself could do in these areas. For that purpose he 
found the writings of the famous René Descartes, which he came upon at that time, very 
useful.
45
 
This is interesting for a variety of reasons, but for our present purposes the important point is that 
Spinoza turned to philosophy because he did not get full satisfaction from the teachers who had 
trained him in letters and theology.  
 
Anyone who reads Menasseh's work and then compares it with the TTP will be able to 
see why Spinoza would have been dissatisfied with it. Repeatedly Menasseh raises problems, 
canvasses solutions to them, and proposes his own solution. Repeatedly Spinoza raises those 
same problems again in the TTP, only to treat them quite differently. Menasseh's work is de-
signed to put doubt to rest; but all too often it merely encourages doubt by its scrupulous account 
of the reasons which can be given on each side and by the unsatisfactory nature of its grounds for 
preferring one solution over another. Sometimes it appears that Menasseh will accept any solu-
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tion, so long as it clears Scripture of the charge of self-contradiction (cf., for example, I, 15). 1 
think we should see Menasseh and the philosophers and commentators of the Jewish tradition 
(e.g., Ibn Ezra and Judah Halevi) as a much more powerful influence on Spinoza than Isaac La 
Peyrère or any of the other figures Popkin has suggested.
46
 
 
-2b- 
 
One thing which distinguishes Spinoza from both Hobbes and La Peyrère is that he has, 
what they do not, a well-worked out theory of what is required for the interpretation of a text. 
Professor Savan quotes a very significant passage from the Preface to the TTP: 
When I weighed these matters in my mind - when I considered that the natural light is 
not only scorned, but condemned by many as a source of impiety, that human inven-
tions are treated as divine teachings, that credulity is considered faith, that the contro-
versies of the Philosophers are debated with the utmost passion in the Church and in the 
State, and that in consequence the most savage hatreds and disagreements arise, by 
which men are easily turned to rebellions - when I considered these and a great many 
other things, which it would take too long to tell here, I resolved earnestly to examine 
Scripture afresh, with an unimpaired and free spirit, to affirm nothing concerning it, and 
to admit nothing as its teaching, which it did not very clearly teach me. With this pre-
caution I constructed a Method of interpreting the Sacred books... (III/9) 
Spinoza does not, in this passage, explicitly invoke the name of Descartes, but it is clear (and 
Popkin has recognized) that what Spinoza is engaged in here is extending the Cartesian method 
to the realm of Biblical interpretation. 
 
He was not unique in trying to do that. That was a project he shared with his good friend 
Louis Meyer, who published in 1666 a work entitled, Philosophy, the Interpreter of Holy Scrip-
ture.
47
 Meyer's preface gives the following account (pp. 24-25) of the situation of theology in his 
day. Whenever a controversy arises among the theologians, they try to settle it by an appeal to 
the word of God, as recorded in Scripture. The fact that this is their ultimate court of appeal is 
what makes them theologians. But their interpretations of scripture are so insecurely based that 
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they are easily refuted. So theology, which is (or at least ought to be) the queen of the sciences, is 
plunged in doubt and uncertainty. Meyer reports that, as he was reflecting on this miserable situ-
ation, there fell into his hands the work on method of the incomparable Descartes, who had final-
ly brought the truth to light, after it had been hidden in darkness for so many centuries, who 
rebuilt philosophy from its foundations and purged it of its defects. Descartes had always been 
careful not to try to apply his method to theology, but Meyer proposes to do just that: to call in 
doubt whatever can be doubted, indeed, to reject it as false, until he can find something firm and 
stable to serve as a foundation. 
 
But though Meyer and Spinoza share an interest in applying Cartesian method to the in-
terpretation of scripture, the ways in which they do this are radically opposed. Meyer quickly 
reaches the conclusion that the foundation of all theology is the proposition that the books of the 
Old and New Testaments are the infallible word of a supremely good and powerful God (p. 27). 
He presents this principle as precisely that, a first principle, subject to the maxim de principiis 
non disputandum est. If someone were to reject this principle, he would quit the field of theolo-
gy. And this gives him the interpretive principle which is implied by the title of his book. Philos-
ophy is to be the interpreter of scripture because scripture is the word of God. He guided the 
hand of the scribes who produced our text. But God is not a deceiver. Therefore, if a proposed 
interpretation of scripture conflicts with what we know in philosophy to be the truth, we can re-
ject that interpretation as false. It does not give the true meaning of the text. (p. 93)  
 
So, for example, since we know philosophically that nothing comes from nothing, we can 
reject any interpretation of the creation story in Genesis which would imply the falsity of that 
maxim. (p. 142) Meyer does also argue that in other scriptural contexts the Hebrew translated by 
create applies to the production of something from some pre-existing material, so his actual pro-
cedure is not entirely a priori. But theoretically this appeal to other contexts is superfluous. 
 
Those familiar with Spinoza's discussion of this topic will recognize that his way of in-
troducing Cartesian method into theology is very different. He explicitly rejects Meyer's position 
in TTP vii, though he does not name Meyer in doing so. His target instead is Maimonides, who 
had argued in The Guide of the Perplexed (II, 25) that if we found a passage in scripture whose 
literal meaning conflicted with something established by reason, we would have to interpret the 
passage figuratively. So, for example, if we had a philosophical demonstration of the eternity of 
the world, we would have to assume that those scriptural passages which appear to deny the 
eternity of the world do not mean what they seem to. When Spinoza is expounding this position, 
he adds, somewhat maliciously, "no matter how clear the meaning of the passage seemed to be." 
 
Spinoza finds this quite unreasonable. It assumes that the prophets agreed among them 
selves, and that they were very good philosophers, whereas Spinoza claims to have shown, from 
an examination of their opinions, that they often disagreed and had very imperfect ideas on 
speculative issues. Moreover, it gives the interpreter of scripture a license to twist its meaning 
to suit his own preconceived ideas. It also has the consequence that, wherever we are not certain 
of the truth, we cannot be certain of the meaning of scripture. And since the bulk of scripture 
consists of things we are not capable of knowing by the natural light - e.g., historical narratives - 
we would have to concede that we simply do not understand what the bulk of scripture means. 
So long as we are not certain by reason whether or not what it says, construed literally, is true, 
we cannot be certain whether or not to take it literally or figuratively.  
 
These objections are as applicable to Meyer's position as they are to that of Maimonides. 
They illustrate that Spinoza would not accept one, prima facie plausible, way of introducing Car-
tesian method into theology. The correct principle for the interpretation of scripture, according to 
Spinoza, is that we must use scripture itself to interpret scripture. This is not a new doctrine. It is, 
rather, the battle-cry of the Protestant Revolution: Scriptura sui ipsius interpres (Scripture is its 
own interpreter).
48
 But in Spinoza's hands this slogan takes on a new meaning. If, as good Carte-
sians, we are to free ourselves from prejudice, we must apply to the interpretation of scripture the 
same method we apply to the interpretation of nature. Just as in interpreting nature we begin by 
putting together a history of nature, from which we infer the definitions, or essential natures, of 
the things with which our science deals, so in the interpretation of scripture we must begin by 
constructing a history of scripture, from which we can infer the intentions of the authors of scrip-
ture. (TTP vii, §7) 
  
Note that Spinoza speaks here of the authors of scripture, not the author. We are not to 
assume from the outset, as Meyer had, that God is the author of scripture. To do so would be to 
fail to comply with the Cartesian maxim that we must free ourselves from prejudice at the begin-
ning of our investigation. We must first determine from scripture what its teachings are, and if 
we find that they are true, then we may infer from that that scripture is of divine origin. 
 
Spinoza does not explain what he means by a history of nature, but I take him to mean 
"history" in a Baconian sense, that is, a descriptive catalogue of the principal phenomena a scien-
tific theory would seek to explain.
49
 He is much more explicit about what he means by a history 
of scripture. It must contain an account of the nature of the language in which scripture was writ-
ten (a dictionary and a grammar of the language); it must include an index of the various things 
said in scripture on various subjects, noting any prima facie obscurities or inconsistencies;
50
 
since this index is to be done as a preliminary to interpretation, it must itself be free from inter-
pretation; in this initial catalogue of the opinions of scripture, we are not to use our own judg-
ments of truth to determine the meanings of the various passages; rather we are to be guided by 
the ordinary use of language; the history must contain (to the extent that these can be known) a 
full description of the life, character, and concerns of the author of each book, when he wrote the 
book and for what reason and in what language, how his text was subsequently transmitted to us, 
how many variant readings of it there are, how it came to be accepted as a sacred book and in-
cluded in the canon; and whether or not the text has become corrupted, either through inadvertent 
error or deliberate falsification. 
 
Once all these data have been compiled, then we may begin the task of determining what 
the teachings of scripture are (§26). In doing this, we follow the same procedure as we do in our 
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investigation of nature; in natural science we look for what is most universal and common and 
try to determine what its laws are; these are the laws of motion and rest; from these we try to de-
duce less universal generalizations; similarly, in scientific hermeneutics we try to determine what 
the universal teachings of the prophets are - that there is one God almighty, who cares for 
all, but particularly for those who love him and love their neighbor as themselves; to these uni-
versal teachings we subordinate those which are peculiar to some of the prophets only, such as 
their particular teachings about the nature of God and the way in which he cares for man; these 
less universal teachings we will not present as scriptural doctrine, even though we may be able to 
determine their truth by the natural light (§28). 
 
Spinoza offers an example which I think is helpful in seeing how this is supposed to 
work. He considers two scriptural statements, each of which might be thought to be contrary to 
reason: God is a fire and God is jealous.
51
 The first of these, he says, is not the universal teaching 
of scripture, in the sense that there are other passages in scripture which prima facie conflict with 
it, passages in which Moses teaches that God has no likeness to any visible thing.
52
 This incon-
sistency creates a presumption that one or more of the conflicting statements is to be understood 
metaphorically rather than literally. But before we can claim that the statement God is a fire is to 
be understood metaphorically, we would have to confirm that there is precedent for a metaphori-
cal use of the term "fire." Since there are passages where it is clear that "fire" is used as a meta-
phor for anger, we are entitled to treat the statement God is a fire as metaphorical. 
 
On the other hand, there are no passages in scripture inconsistent with the frequent claim 
that God is jealous.
53
 Nowhere do Moses or the other prophets teach that God is not susceptible 
to passions. So that statement must be reckoned among the universal teachings of scripture and 
taken literally, even though it is contrary to reason. Spinoza operates with a strong presumption 
in favor of literal interpretation (§20), which can only be rebutted by a showing that literal inter-
pretation leads to inconsistency within scripture itself, and cannot be rebutted by a finding of in-
consistency with reason. 
 
Earlier I suggested that Professor Maull did not seem to have read the TTP with sufficient 
care to appreciate its importance and I promised to explain why later. I think we have enough 
exposition at hand now to offer the promised explanation. She seems to be under the impression 
that the point of the comparison between the interpretation of scripture and the interpretation of 
nature is to establish what the interpretation of nature must be like, given what the interpretation 
of scripture is like. In interpreting scripture we apply to it principles antecedently known by the 
light of reason. So we should do the same thing in the interpretation of nature. 
 
But this is doubly wrong. The point of the comparison is rather to move from the method 
of interpreting nature, which we are presumed to understand, to the method of interpreting scrip-
ture, which we do not yet understand, which it is rather Spinoza's business to explain to us. 
Moreover, Spinoza explicitly repudiates the idea that in interpreting scripture we should apply to 
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it principles antecedently known by the light of reason. That's the Meyer-Maimonides line which 
he rejects. So if the analogy between scriptural interpretation and interpretation of nature holds, 
he would also have to reject the notion that in interpreting nature we are merely applying prin-
ciples antecedently known by the light of reason. 
 
-3- 
 
I turn now to my final question: is hermeneutics, understood as an enterprise which seeks an in-
terpretation of texts, a science? So I hope, and so I believe. That is what I do. I interpret texts, 
either as a translator or as a commentator. I suppose that I might find this enterprise just as fasci-
nating if I did not think of it as fundamentally comparable to what scientists do, but I am not sure 
about that.  
 
Some people turn from philosophy to the history of philosophy because they despair of 
discovering the truth in philosophy; discovering the truth in the history of philosophy seems a 
more manageable task. I have not despaired of discovering philosophical truth; I pursue histori-
cal truth partly because I think understanding how we got to the point we have reached in the de-
velopment of this discipline may be a means to discovering philosophical truth. But I also think 
that coming to understand what our predecessors thought about the problems of philosophy of-
fers intrinsic pleasures analogous to those a crossword puzzle addict might feel in solving a diffi-
cult puzzle, and I cannot imagine what it would be like to feel such pleasure if you did not also 
believe that there is such a thing as a correct solution to the puzzle and that you might be able to 
work out what that solution was. By "work out the solution" here I mean "come to have a high 
degree of confidence, reasonably founded, that a particular solution is the correct solution." 
 
I take it that many thoughtful people would say that my conception of what I am doing 
involves a delusion, that the interpretation of texts is not like the sciences, in the sense that it in-
volves methodological difficulties which make it inappropriate to speak of the correct solution to 
a problem arising within them. I find the following argument in the literature: the basic principle 
advocated by Luther and Spinoza for the interpretation of Scripture is valid for the interpretation 
of any text; the text is its own interpreter, in the sense that if we have a question about the mean-
ing of one part of a text, we must seek the answer to our question in the text as a whole; but this 
interpretive principle leads to what is called the hermeneutic circle; the meaning of the whole can 
only be grasped on the basis of the parts, which in turn cannot be understood except by grasping 
the meaning of the whole; this circularity is not vicious (i.e., it does not entail the impossibility 
of ever arriving at any understanding of any text or the impossibility of ever providing rational 
grounds for preferring one interpretation to another); but it does have the consequence that any 
interpretation must always be provisional, subject to revision on further reflection; the validity of 
one interpretation does not exclude the possibility of there being other interpretations, equally 
valid, but inconsistent with the first interpretation; this difficulty afflicts any discipline, such as 
history, to which the interpretation of texts is fundamental; so the history of philosophy in partic-
ular, and humanistic studies in general, cannot be sciences. Not only am I mistaken in my con-
ception of what I do, but Spinoza was wrong to see the interpretation of Scripture as being 
essentially analogous to the interpretation of nature.
54
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 Let me call this the argument from the hermeneutic circle. I hope and believe that it fair-
ly represents a kind of argument which has had a good deal of popularity in recent years. On 
that assumption, I make the following observations: 
 
As stated, the argument does seem to presuppose something I find very dubious (and ra-
ther surprising, given what I believe to be the paternity of the argument). It seems rather a posi-
tivistic argument, in that it apparently involves the following move: 
Premise: You can never be certain of the validity of any particular interpretation of a 
text. 
Conclusion: It is inappropriate to speak of any particular interpretation as the correct in-
terpretation of a text. 
I can see why someone who held a particular form of the verifiability theory of meaning might 
accept this argument. If you think that a sentence must be conclusively verifiable in order to be 
meaningful, and if you think that no sentence of the form "The correct interpretation of T is I" is 
conclusively verifiable, then it can never be meaningful to claim that a particular interpretation 
of a text is the correct one, and so it will always be inappropriate to make such a claim.  
 
But the strong form of the verifiability principle presupposed by that argument was long 
ago abandoned by the positivists as indefensible.
55
 I think they were right to abandon it, and I 
don't at the moment see what assumption short of that form of the verifiability principle would 
work. 
 
I imagine that someone who wished to press the argument from the hermeneutic circle 
might reply to this along the following lines: of course, that strong form of the verifiability prin-
ciple is indefensible as a criterion of meaning; I can know perfectly well what it means to say 
that Peter denied Jesus without being able to verify conclusively that that sentence is true; so we 
should give up that part of the hermeneutic-circle argument which says that the "openness of the 
text" (i.e., the fact that any interpretation of a text is always provisional and subject to revision 
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in the light of further reflection) implies that we cannot properly speak of the correct interpreta-
tion of the text; still, the argument is correct in pointing to a fundamental methodological diffi-
culty which makes research in the humanistic disciplines different in kind from research in the 
natural sciences; the hermeneutic circle does imply the openness of the text, and that in turn im-
plies that disciplines essentially involving the interpretation of texts aren't sciences in the way 
that the natural sciences are. 
 
If I understand this reply properly, it involves a view of what happens in the natural 
sciences which is as difficult to defend as the strong version of the verifiability principle which 
I just rejected. The argument seems to be: 
Premise: Because of the hermeneutic circle, interpretations are always subject to revi-
sion. 
Intermediate conclusion: We can never say with certainty that any interpretation is cor-
rect. 
Final conclusion: The interpretation of texts is an enterprise different in kind from in-
quiry in the natural sciences. 
The problem here is that the argument must assume that we have in the natural sciences a kind 
of certainty unavailable to us in the interpretive disciplines. And unfortunately, that doesn't 
seem to be true. At any rate, I think Quine's doctrine that no statement in the sciences is im-
mune to revision
56
 has a broad measure of acceptance nowadays, at least if it is restricted to 
statements in the natural sciences and excludes the truths of pure mathematics and logic. 
 
At this point someone who wished to press the argument from the hermeneutic circle 
might say: all right, that is how enlightened people now think about the natural sciences; the 
history of science has taught them not to dogmatically claim certainty for whatever scientific 
theory happens to hold the field at the moment; but this is a very different view of science from 
Spinoza's; Spinoza is a Cartesian about the natural sciences; he thinks of them as proceeding by 
finding some presuppositionless starting point, and arguing deductively from there, so that the 
conclusions of the sciences are absolutely certain; when he compares the interpretation of texts 
to inquiry in the sciences, he is committed to regarding the interpretation of texts as capable of 
achieving certainty. 
 
I think it is unclear, however, just how far Descartes and Spinoza really thought it possi-
ble to achieve absolute certainty in the sciences. At the end of the Principles of Philosophy (IV, 
204-206) Descartes addresses this issue as it arises for the scientific theories advocated in that 
work. He claims, first, that his theories are at least morally certain, i.e., certain enough that it 
would be reasonable to act on them if the situation called for action. In this regard he compares 
them to the solution of a coded message. Suppose we had a message, written in Latin, but en-
coded in such a way that the letters did not have their normal value. Each letter, say, has 
been replaced by the one immediately following it in the alphabet. If you substitute A for B, B 
for C, etc., you get a Latin message in which all the words combine to say something intelligible, 
whereas previously they didn't. You may recognize the possibility that there is an alternative key 
to the code, where different substitutions produce a different message, though one which is 
equally intelligible, just as this Sunday's crossword puzzle in the Times might in principle have 
two solutions, globally distinct from one another, yet each equally plausible in terms of fit. But if 
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the message is a long one, you will think this possibility so improbable as not to be worth consi-
dering. If called on to act, you will not hesitate to act on the assumption that your interpretation 
of the message is correct. In the absence of the divine guarantee, that is the status Descartes 
claims for his scientific theories. His account of magnetism, for example, offers a simple expla-
nation from which we can deduce everything we observe about magnetic bodies. It is possible 
that the explanation is incorrect, but the likelihood of that is so small as to be negligible. 
 
The divine guarantee is supposed to alter the situation. Once we know that God is su-
premely good and in no way a deceiver, we think that at least some of our beliefs, "even about 
matters in nature," are absolutely certain, i.e., it is simply not possible that things should be 
other than we judge them to be. But what is the scope of this certainty? Mathematical demon-
strations fall within it. So does the belief that material things exist and any evident reasoning 
we can produce about material things. But what of the other things Descartes has written in 
this treatise? Descartes expresses the hope that they will all be accepted, but he seems disposed 
to insist only on "the more general things I have written about the world and the earth." Just 
what that includes is unclear, but the expression does seem to allow that a wide range of Des-
cartes' explanations are only morally certain. 
 
How much of this Cartesian philosophy of science would Spinoza have accepted? I 
think it's very difficult to say. We know that he rejected much of Cartesian science, even with 
respect to the more general things, such as the laws of impact.
57
 And the preface to his geome-
tric exposition of Descartes' Principles suggests that he did not find the Cartesian argument for 
a divine guarantee very satisfactory. Since Spinoza conceives of God very differently than 
Descartes does, rejecting the whole idea of God as a personal being, this is only to be ex-
pected. Descartes would say that if you reject the argument from a divine guarantee, the most 
you can hope for is moral certainty. I suspect that Spinoza would disagree with that assess-
ment, but I don't find that he ever explains clearly how we can get more than moral certainty, 
or how far into the domain of science that certainty would extend. 
 
In a certain sense, though, it doesn't matter how we understand Descartes and Spinoza 
on these issues. If what we want to know is whether or not the interpretation of texts is analog-
ous to inquiry in the natural sciences, and not whether it is analogous to inquiry in the natural 
sciences as the latter inquiry was perhaps overoptimistically conceived by Descartes and Spi-
noza, the tentative nature of interpretation is not an obstacle. We have yet to find a good rea-
son for regarding the two enterprises as fundamentally different. 
 
I close by considering one further suggestion as to the difference. Connolly and Keut-
ner suggest that in a natural science such as geology a question such as that about the age of 
certain fossils 
counts as decidable in principle, and establishing facts of this kind constitutes an 
important part of such disciplines. But in literary criticism decidable questions, such as 
those concerning the author's intention, are by no means reckoned as of central 
importance, since in the ongoing debate about the meaning of the text critics regularly 
overrule even the expressed intention of the author. While decidable and undecidable 
interpretations mark both the natural sciences and the humanities, they are weighted 
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within those disciplines in contrary ways: decidability is central in the sciences, 
undecidability in the humanities... (op. cit., p. 58, their emphases) 
Now I'm sure that the establishing of facts does constitute an important part of what natural 
scientists do (though it may be a greater part in a science like geology than in, say, quantum me-
chanics, where the major problem seems to be more one of interpretation of experimental data). 
But one thing I find dubious in this contrast is the implication that the practice of literary critics 
is representative of what happens in the humanities in general. 
 
Let me confess, first of all, that I do find it to be of central importance to my work to de-
termine what the author's intention may have been in writing the words he did. What makes a set 
of inscriptions on the page words in a language, and not mere random scratchings, is the fact that 
the person who wrote them intended them to be taken in a certain way by those familiar with the 
conventions of the language he was writing in. If the author's intention in writing what he did is 
decidable, then for me that has great weight in determining the meaning of the text. I can imagine 
considerations which might lead me to discount the author's claims about his meaning (e.g., pride 
makes him reluctant to admit a mistake, or fear of persecution makes him reluctant to admit an 
unorthodox view to a correspondent who cannot be trusted to keep such matters confidential). 
But without some such reason I cannot imagine overruling the author's clearly expressed inten-
tions. If literary critics regularly behave differently, then they approach texts with a very differ-
ent purpose than I do.
58
 
 
What I would like to suggest is that we think of the interpretation of texts in terms of 
what we might call (with apologies to Quine) three grades of interpretive involvement. At the 
lowest level, there is the kind of interpretation involved in determining, say, whether a particular 
translation of a text is an accurate or faithful translation. This kind of question arises quite com-
monly in my area. The three philosophers whom I have been most interested in, Descartes, 
Hobbes, and Spinoza, all wrote at a time when Latin was on the way out as the primary medium 
for philosophical discourse. So for each of these philosophers we frequently have an original text 
written in Latin and a translation into a vernacular language which has at least some claim to the 
author's approval and may even have been written by the author himself.
59
 Serious scholars may 
devote a great deal of their time to carefully comparing the two versions, on the theory that varia-
tions in the translation might reflect a decision by the author to present his ideas in a different 
way.
60
 
 
This certainly constitutes an important part of the history of philosophy, as it is current-
ly practised, and I think it has as good a claim to be the establishment of facts as, say, a geolo-
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gist's conclusions about the age of certain fossils. These are the data we construct theories to 
explain. E.g., in the English version of Leviathan (1651, ch. xiv, ¶5) Hobbes claims that from 
the fundamental law of nature there follows a second law, 
That a man be willing, when others are too, as far forth as for peace and defense of 
himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down his right to all things... 
In the Latin version (published only in 1668, but possibly written, in part at least, before the 
English) the corresponding sentence reads: 
oportere unumquemque, quoties paci et defensioni propriae provisum erit, a jure suo in 
omnia, caeteris idem facere paratis, decedere... 
In his French translation of Leviathan Tricaud quotes both the English and the Latin for the 
italicised portion of this law, gives French versions of both texts, and comments, with master-
ful understatement, la nuance n'est pas sans importance. The point is that for the italicised 
phrase we cannot simply regard the Latin as a faithful reproduction (within the limits of what 
can be done in transferring to another language) of the English. That would be a reasonable 
enough judgment for the rest of the sentence, but the italicised phrase might best be translated 
into English as "whenever provision has been made for peace and his own defense." And this 
says something different enough that a conscientious editor will want to call it to the attention 
of the reader. The English version leaves it to the individual to determine whether or not he 
thinks adequate provision has been made for his safety; if not, he is not obliged to lay aside his 
natural right to all things. In the Latin, it is sufficient for his being obliged if he is in fact se-
cure, whether he thinks so or not. 
 
Recognizing that the Latin text says something different than the English requires 
competence both in Latin and in English. Recognizing that the difference may have some im-
portance for larger issues of interpretation requires an analogous competence in philosophy. So 
we're not dealing here with a pure datum. But it seems to me that this is a comparatively objec-
tive matter, about which I would expect those with the relevant competences to agree. Indeed, 
I would go so far as to suggest that agreement about this is a test of a person's possession of 
the relevant competences. So I would count determining that Hobbes stated the second law of 
nature differently in the Latin Leviathan than he did in the English as a matter of establishing a 
fact, in just as good a sense as the dating of a fossil might be a matter of establishing a fact for 
a geologist. 
 
Other textual issues, I think, present a different order of difficulty. In the Dedicatory 
Letter of the English Leviathan Hobbes writes 
That which perhaps may most offend [sc. in my book] are certain texts of Holy Scrip-
ture, alleged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to be by others. 
Now there's a sense in which we understand well enough the meaning of that sentence. We can 
recognize that the following Latin sentence is a pretty faithful translation of it: 
Displicebit etiam fortasse non paucis, quod loca quaedam Scripturae Sacrae aliter in-
terpretari ausus sim, quam ab aliis explicari soleant. 
Let us stipulate that there are nuances here which make the Latin not an exact equivalent of the 
English.
61
 My point is that they don't amount to anything by comparison with the larger uncer-
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 If we were to translate the Latin back into English, aiming at a pretty literal translation of the Latin, but 
staying as close to the English original as possible, we might produce the following: "It will, perhaps, also offend 
not a few people that I have dared to interpret certain texts of Holy Scripture otherwise than ordinarily they use to 
tainty about Hobbes' meaning. We don't know what passages of Scripture he is referring to, when 
he warns us that some of his interpretations of Scripture may be offensive. Determining that re-
quires something more than philological competence. It requires a knowledge of how Scripture 
was read in his day. To answer this question, we might look at contemporary reactions to Levia-
than, to see what his contemporaries did in fact find offensive in his scriptural interpretation. 
And if we think, unlikely as it may seem, that those contemporaries did not exhaust the possibili-
ties for being offended, that they may have let certain unorthodox interpretations slip by without 
objection, we might check his interpretations of those other scriptural passages against the inter-
pretations which dominated scriptural exegesis in his time. But though there is an uncertainty 
about Hobbes' meaning which it requires something more than philological competence to re-
solve, this question too seems to me decidable, in a perfectly good sense of that term. We know 
how to find out, with an acceptable level of certainty, which passages in Scripture Hobbes was 
referring to (or at least what some of them very probably were). 
 
On the third level of difficulty I would place such utterances as the remark Aubrey re-
ports Hobbes as making to him, after having read Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise: 
He has outthrown me a bar's length, for I durst not write so boldly. 
This is truly a problematic text. While a competent translator might be able to render it into 
another language, with greater or lesser loss of nuance, its meaning is uncertain to a degree and 
in a way that the meanings of the previous statements are not. I have written at length about 
this remark, using such philological, historical and philosophical skills as I possess, to try to 
determine what it was in Spinoza's work which Hobbes so admired, and what he might have 
wished to say in his own work had he felt freer to speak his mind.
62
  
 
This kind of exercise, though it may have great interest, deals with a kind of question 
which may well be undecidable. Perhaps this remark is not different in principle from the one I 
cited from the Dedicatory Letter. I can imagine someone saying "If only Aubrey had pressed 
Hobbes to explain his meaning, and then left us a record of Hobbes' reply, we might be able to 
answer this question with some degree of assurance." And that's true. Unfortunately, it seems 
that Aubrey didn't do that. And he and Hobbes are both dead now, so the opportunity has been 
irrevocably lost. It's not that we have no idea how to proceed in this case. We can make a care-
ful comparison between Leviathan and the Theological-Political Treatise, looking for signs in 
the latter work of a boldness greater than Hobbes displayed in the former. But if we are candid 
about the results of such an inquiry, we have to admit that it is a highly speculative undertak-
ing. 
 
The questions Connolly and Keutner force us to consider are these: to what extent is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
be by others." The principal difference I find is that in the Latin Hobbes confesses to an act of daring. But reflection 
on the matter of nuances also suggests an ambiguity in the English which the Latin resolves: does the phrase "that 
which may most offend" mean "what will offend more people than anything else I say" or "what will offend the 
people who are offended more deeply than anything else I say"? The Latin suggests the former reading of the 
English, though we needn't assume that in writing the English Hobbes was aware of the ambiguity and intended his 
words to be taken in the former way rather than the latter. Perhaps he only became conscious of the ambiguity 
when he had to express his thought in another language. Perhaps he was never conscious of it. In any case, what 
seems to me most important is, not that the Latin is not an exact equivalent of the English, but that we can 
recognize and agree about the ways in which it fails to be an exact equivalent. 
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this last kind of interpretive issue representative of work in the humanities? and are such diffi-
cult issues really more prominent in the humanities than they are in the natural sciences? 
Mightn't the impression which some humanists have that their disciplines involve deeper le-
vels of uncertainty simply result from the fact that their first hand experience of science typi-
cally is with those parts of science which are no longer of serious interest to scientists working 
on the frontiers of their discipline? I pose these questions. I will not presume to answer them, 
though I suppose that what I have written suggests an answer. 
 
I propose that we replace the image of a hermeneutical circle with that of a hermeneut-
ical spiral. A geometrical circle is a figure all of whose points are equidistant from its center. 
This is apt to suggest, wrongly, that all the elements in any given text are equally uncertain, 
and hence that the meaning of the text as a whole is radically uncertain. Instead, I would offer 
the image of a spiral, rising screw-like from a broad base to a sharp point. At the base I would 
place such relatively secure interpretive judgments as the following: 
In Leviathan (ch. xiii, 16) Hobbes writes that the "three principal causes of quarrel" are 
"competition... diffidence... and glory." By "diffidence" he means, not modesty (OED 
sense 2), but mistrust (OED sense 1). 
Here philological competence is central and the element of uncertainty is minimal. A good 
translation here will not leave the ambiguity unresolved. 
 
Somewhat further up my hermeneutical spiral I would place such riskier judgments as 
this: 
In Leviathan (ch. xii, ¶32) Hobbes writes that he attributes all changes in religion to 
one cause, "unpleasing priests, and those not only amongst Catholics, but even in that 
Church that hath presumed most of Reformation." This last is probably a passing shot 
at the Presbyterians. 
Here we require more than philological competence to understand the text, and a faithful transla-
tion of the passage would raise precisely the same problems of interpretation as the original 
does.
63
 Accordingly, the level of uncertainty is higher. But it seems clear that there is a right an-
swer here, which is (roughly) the answer Hobbes would have given had he been asked to explain 
his meaning under circumstances conducive to candid communication. The right answer may not 
be "the best interpretation," if the latter phrase means something like "the one which represents 
the current consensus of competent interpreters, working out of a tradition of ongoing debate 
about the meaning of the text." But if we have learned anything from the Reformation, we should 
have learned not to trust too much to the authority of interpretive traditions. 
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 Clarendon professes to see in this sentence a reference to the Church of England. (A Brief View and Survey of 
the dangerous and pernicious Errors to Church and State, In Mr. Hobbes's Book Entitled Leviathan, Oxford, 1676, 
p. 25) This has some plausibility, insofar as the unpopular policies of Archbishop Laud led to schism in the Church. 
But the great criticism of Laud was that he was a papist at heart, and I think it would be more natural to take "that 
Church that presumed most of [= made the greatest claim to] Reformation" to be the Church which criticised the 
Church of England for being insufficiently reformed. In Behemoth, Hobbes will say of the Presbyterians that they 
"introduced many strange and many pernicious doctrines, out-doing the Reformation, as they pretended, both of 
Luther and Calvin, receding from the former divinity (or church philosophy, for religion is another thing) as much as 
Luther and Calvin had receded from the pope." (Behemoth, ed. by F. Tönnies, intr. By Stephen Holmes, U of 
Chicago P, 1990, p. 136) Hobbes considered the Presbyterian ministers ambitious hypocrites, whose insistence on 
imposing "odd opinions" on the people led to the fragmentation of the Reformation into many sects. Cf. Behemoth, 
pp. 21-30, 57, 155, 169, 172, and in Leviathan, xlvii, ¶20 (pp. 710-712 in Macpherson). 
At the peak of my hermeneutical spiral I would place such highly venturesome judg-
ments as this: 
In his prose autobiography Hobbes writes words which we might most naturally take to 
mean that he was a sincere Christian.
64
 Probably we should take that remark with a 
grain of salt. 
Here we are dealing with a puzzle we shall probably never resolve with any great and justified 
confidence, and one, unfortunately, which has an enormous impact on our interpretation of Le-
viathan as a whole.
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 Here, I think, we must learn to live with substantial uncertainty. But we 
should not suppose that all texts, and hence all the data we can bring to bear on this question, are 
as uncertain as that one. Our situation is not that desperate. 
I conclude, with Spinoza, that it is proper for interpreters of texts to think of themselves 
as engaged in an enterprise not fundamentally different from the one natural scientists are en-
gaged in.
66
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 Opera latina I, xvii, commenting on the fact that on his return to England he had attended church regularly, 
although at that time no one was legally obliged to do so: Alterum hoc signum erat non modo hominis partium 
episcopalium, sed etiam Christiani sinceri. 
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 E.g., on the question whether Hobbes really does want us to think of his laws of nature as divine commands, 
as he perhaps suggests in the English (but not the Latin) version of the final ¶ of ch. xv. 
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 I'm indebted to a number of people for comments on earlier versions of this paper, more than I can now re-
member. But those most prominent in my memory at the moment are: Richard Popkin, John Connolly, Donald Mar-
shall, Rod Bertolet, and in a general way, the members of the Purdue philosophy department. 
 
